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U.S. Agricultural Policy in 2004:  Ripe for Reform, Repackaging, or Routine? 
 
Current U.S. agricultural policy rests on the foundation of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938, the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, and the 
Agricultural Act of 1949, the only permanent farm legislation. The retrofit of 1930/40’s 
agricultural policy to the world of 30, 40, and 50 years later, has been roundly criticized, 
and such criticism well rationalized, by a series of keen analysts over the years. Yet, little 
fundamental change has taken place.  The scope of farm payments and the cost of 
agricultural support have not only continued, but have grown, even since passage in1996 
of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act. In the words of recent 
critics, “the central policy reform problem in American agriculture endures: the problem 
of removing programs and entitlements that have lost their original justification” (Orden, 
Paarlberg and Roe, p. 2).   Without rehashing the question of how current farm policy 
fails to further, and in a number of ways conflicts with, efficient market function in 2004, 
this paper seeks to identify and examine a series of factors that may drive or constrain 
U.S. farm policy change between 2004 and 2007 (The latter is the year during which 
current farm legislation is due to expire).   
Major reform
1 doesn’t happen as the result of logical argument.  It occurs when 
the costs (monetary, political, strategic, and/or psychic) of existing policy exceed the 
costs of reform, and/or when those bearing the costs of the status quo have greater 
political clout than those bearing the costs of reform. The political economic view of the 
world relates clout, in turn, to the per capita gains or losses experienced by a stakeholding 
group as a result of policy change (Becker; see Gardner for empirical evidence of this for   2
agricultural programs).  A number of factors appear to be tipping the scales toward higher 
costs of keeping than adjusting U.S. farm policy. But, in handicapping change in U.S. 
farm policy, it is important to account also for who bears the costs of adjustment. 
Here, I present interpretive implications of the Federal budget situation, WTO 
commitments, the politics of environmental quality, land values, and resource 
fixity/flexibility in agriculture, for the chances that farm policy reform occurs. 
Fiscal Fidelity 
The FAIR Act decoupled farm payments from specific commodities’ production, 
but it has not proven successful in reducing the level of farm payments.  Total Federal 
government payments to farmers exceeded $22 billion per year, each year, 1999-2001, 
with 40-45 percent of those payments coming from emergency supplemental 
appropriations.  Emergency, disaster, and ad-hoc payments are playing an ever larger part 
in supplementing cash returns to production, and the definition of what constitutes an 
“emergency” has broadened to include low prices (through supplemental Market Loss 
Assistance programs), Federal nonagricultural actions (water diversion from agriculture 
to protect salmon in the Klamath River basin), and a potpourri of situations that, while 
not emergencies in the traditional sense, are disadvantageous to particular producer 
groups (Smith, 2004).   Figure 1 shows the substantial growth in total payments to farm 
operators that occurred over the period 1991-2001, and its acceleration from 1997 
following passage of the FAIR Act. Only high commodity prices have kept government 
payments down in 2002-2004.  But when commodity prices decline next time, they could 
do so in a period characterized by a growing Federal budget deficit, and high 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 The concept of “reform” is subject to interpretation. When I use the word in this paper, I am referring to a 
consistent, long-standing shift in the philosophical bases for and/or goals and mechanisms of Federal farm   3
expectations by producers that the Federal government will “resolve” any low price 
“emergency.”  The expectation of government support goes well beyond the counter-
cyclical payments designed to buffer traditional program crop producers against market 
volatility.   Market loss assistance has gone in recent years to producers of all sorts of 
commodities, including fruits and other specialty crops.  
There is, then, a high probability that a large number of different types of 
American farmers who have been sensitized to Federal support will again be expecting 
substantial, collective government payments, just as the Federal budget is being cut to 
lessen the deficit.  Clearly, the monetary costs of maintaining current policy are high. At 
question is whether they are high enough to be a “tipping factor.”  Even at their highest 
(in 2002), agriculture program costs represented only 2 percent of all Federal budget 
outlays (Economic Report of the President).    
Furthermore, the flip side of having broadened the definition of “emergency” and 
the types of producers who qualify for market loss assistance is that current farm policy 
has gained new stakeholders. The more stakeholders there are in the status quo, the 
harder it is to reform. Once apple and cranberry growers have felt the warmth of 
government support, how can they be sent back into the cold, cruel world of market 
forces? 
World Trade Organization Challenges 
The (still, as of this writing) purported decision of a World Trade Organization 
(WTO) dispute settlement panel favoring Brazil in alleging that U.S. cotton support 
payments harm other countries, could be the first in a series of challenges to the way 
American farm programs have been doing business. The dispute contends that Federal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
policy. Major reform would require replacement of the 1949 legislation with a new permanent Act.    4
payments to cotton producers (decoupled or not) violate WTO rules because they 
artificially increase American competitive advantage in cotton production, keeping world 
cotton prices low, and impoverishing cotton producers in less developed countries.  The 
signal from the WTO seems to be that it is not just the level of support that counts in 
reforming trade, but also the nature of the support and its effect in the global marketplace. 
If this decision stands, it could be only the first among a number of other obvious targets 
(rice, for example) for the same argument.  Failing to comply with the removal of a WTO 
violation carries a potentially large price tag. WTO-allowable retaliation against the U.S. 
could occur within or outside the agricultural sector. If an agricultural subsidy ends up 
harming interests in a more powerful sector against which retaliation is aimed 
(telecommunications, for example), new, extra-agricultural domestic as well as 
international pressure could be aimed at reforming American farm policy.   
An alternative to fighting the WTO decision would be to comply by dismantling 
the policy mechanisms through which U.S. cotton production is supported -- an action 
that, if it is politically possible at all, would not be possible without simultaneously 
making radical changes in the programs supporting other traditional “program crops” and 
benefiting the downstream industries that rely on sustained production.  
The question at this point is whether WTO-induced costs of retaining current U.S. 
farm programs are more likely to lead to true policy reform, or to “repackaging” farm 
programs so that they deliver the same benefits to the same stakeholders via WTO-legal 
means.  Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, minimally distorting payments for a 
variety of purposes (such as environmental enhancement) are classified within the “green 
box” and are exempt from domestic support reduction commitments.  Would the same   5
level of support (as now) to cotton producers for practicing environmentally sound 
production methods be subject to the same scrutiny by the WTO?  Perhaps -- but if so, 
might it act to slow down the rate of true reform? 
Valuing Environmental Quality 
Over the last four decades, concern about environmental quality has grown from a 
liberal, fringe movement to a generally accepted, consensual force of politics. While the 
environment competes with other contemporary priorities, and, in the absence of major 
environmental crises, does not automatically manifest itself in support for specific 
policies, it does translate into “opportunities to transform attitudes into action” (Bosso, p. 
58). Thus, the approach of every new farm bill’s debate since 1985 has been hailed as an 
opportunity for merging agricultural and environmental quality goals (See, Taylor, for 
example.  …Okay, okay, I’ve done too! …Smith, 1995)   The Conservation Security 
Program (CSP), authorized by the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act, 
is an important example of this kind of opportunism. 
The CSP, which is not yet implemented, would provide payments to all 
participating producers, no matter what they raise, in return for a particular, demonstrated 
level of environmental stewardship or conservation practice 
(http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/csp/).  It is the first agri-environmental program 
classified as an entitlement.  If implemented as originally envisioned by its chief 
legislative sponsor, Senator Tom Harkin, the CSP could easily cost as much to operate in 
any given year as do traditional farm programs now. Consequently, various alternatives 
for essentially capping the entitlement (oxymoronic as that may be) have been proposed 
by the Executive Branch to keep costs under control. The cap, in turn, creates a dilemma:   6
If all producers are eligible, but funds are limited, how can the program be implemented? 
Disputes between the Legislative and Executive branches over the implementation of the 
CSP suggest a grappling with the question of how Americans value farming/farmers/farm 
safety nets vis-a-vis environmental quality; this despite evidence that environmental 
stewardship can easily be consistent with good business (Aigner, Hopkins, and 
Johansson). It all comes down to a simple fact: if the agricultural budget is to remain 
constant or decrease to do its part in deficit reduction, even a limited CSP, estimated by 
the Congressional Budget Office to cost $13 billion in its first 7 years, is either an 
addition to whatever traditional farm programs cost (making agricultural funding more 
visible and potentially vulnerable) or a subtraction from the funding devoted to farm 
support via traditional policy mechanisms.  Green payment programs like the CSP would 
have to replace traditional farm programs if they are to be carried out in full under a 
budget constraint.  That would constitute major reform. 
The CSP, like broadened “emergency” payments, also acts to increase the number 
and type of stakeholders in agricultural policy, including producers of commodities that 
are not now supported in any other way.  But in this case, the stakeholders have a stake in 
seeing a reformed or, at a minimum, repackaged farm policy – one that builds economic 
support on the back of environmental enhancement. 
Farmland Values  
There is ample evidence that farm program payments are capitalized into 
farmland values (Moss and Schmitz).  This effect creates an obstacle to reform of 
traditional farm policy because any drop in land values increases the cost of farm policy 
change relative to the cost of retaining the status quo.    7
 
Based on survey data from 2000, ERS analysts found that, nationwide, farm 
commodity payments account for 19.7 percent of the value of farmland used in the 
production of program crops; farm programs have the highest proportionate effect on 
land values in the heartland region (Barnard, et al.) A recent Heartland-centered analysis 
of Illinois production under current commodity programs finds that programs authorized 
by the 2002 FSRI Act provide a stronger safety net to corn/soybean producers than did 
programs in effect between 1974-2001, and suggests that, because “the attendant land 
price support effect is also large,” the risk associated with any change in commodity 
policy is also heightened (Hauser et al.).  This is what that study’s analysts refer to as the 
“bad news of today’s commodity programs” (Hauser et al., p. 1).    
If farm program payments were to drop abruptly, or be redistributed more 
broadly, farm operators who had recently purchased land would be unable to pay off their 
debt as land prices adjust downward to reflect lower expectations about program 
payments.  Farm operators who rent land on a share lease basis would likely see an initial 
jump in the landlord’s share required to renew a lease, and cash renters would see initial 
increases in rent from landlords that have to pay off debt on land whose value is 
dropping. Since land rental or land payments can be a large portion of farm operator’s 
expenses, and land is the principal asset keeping farm operator-owner’s wealth at high 
levels (Mishra, et al.), the immediate effect of depressed land prices due to lowered farm 
program payments would be a loss in farm wealth and/or income. 
On the other hand, over time, as land prices and adjusted cash and share lease 
arrangements begin to reflect more the market value of their return to farming than the   8
value of expected farm program payments, farmers, in aggregate, could be better off than 
before the radical change occurred. Why? Those farmers who survive the transition 
period and rent land will face lower land rental costs.  With lowered costs of production, 
they are more likely to weather periods of commodity price downturns.  And, it would be 
easier than at present for beginning farmers to invest in lower priced land and enter the 
farming sector. 
But, wait a minute: If the fact that high farmland prices are tied to high support 
payments is in some ways “bad news,” then it is bad news to a lot of people besides farm 
operators. A substantial portion of land used in farming – 42 percent in 1999 -- is not 
owned by farmers. Non-operator owners receive much of the cropland value attributable 
to commodity program payments – as much as $25 billion of the total $40 billion value of 
cropland in commodity programs in the Heartland in 2000 (Barnard et al.). Thus, there 
would be an additional cost, borne by a relatively wealthy nonfarm population, of any 
change in farm policy that lowers or redirects farm program payments. Guessing how the 
farmland value tie-in to farm policy affects the chances of policy reform, repackaging, or 
routine, involves the difficult task of comparing the values of near term costs to current 
farmers and permanent losses to current farmland owners, against the values of 
production cost-savings gains to future farmers and easier entry into farming.  
Diversification in Agriculture 
There is no denying the growing breadth of stakeholders in traditional U.S. farm 
policy mechanisms.  But is the depth of stake-holding as strong as it was in the past; still 
strong enough to turn stakeholders into proactive rent-seekers?  This is an important 
question given evidence that American agriculture, farming, and farm production may be   9
acting more as a part of a portfolio of diversified interests than being the sole interest at 
stake. 
Let’s look at farm households, a group generally considered to have the greatest 
stake in a Federally supported agricultural sector.  Recent ERS analysis of farm 
household financial information demonstrates that the contribution of farming to the 
income of farm households is decreasing as farm households have diversified how and 
where they earn income. In 1999, nearly 90 percent of total farm household income 
originated from off-farm sources (Mishra, et al.).  Furthermore, it is off-farm income that 
appears to stabilize farm household income, even as agricultural markets exhibit 
volatility.  This phenomenon is not restricted to the households of small or financially 
struggling farms, nor is it related so much to a need to cover farm/ranch expenses as it is 
to increasing family income in general (Johnson and Mishra).  The wealth base as well as 
income streams of farm households have diversified over time. The nonfarm share of 
farm household wealth increased from 15 to 31 percent of total farm household wealth 
between 1993 and 1999 (Mishra, et al.).   Farm household financial diversification may 
suggest that the cost to farm households of farm policy reform is declining, at least in 
aggregate. 
Let’s also look upstream and downstream from the farm. Seed, agricultural 
chemical, and other farm input industries have always had a stake in the maintenance of a 
large, viable farm sector, since farms make up their market.  However, these input 
industries are increasingly subject to mergers into and acquisitions by more diversified 
corporations.   Fernandez-Cornejo’s diagrams of the evolution of major seed companies, 
for example, show how Arnold Thomas Seed Company, and 6 other independent seed   10
companies, were acquired by Pioneer Hi-Bred International which, in turn was bought by 
Dupont Corporation.  Dupont, as a highly diversified chemical corporation, is less 
invested, in absolute terms, in American farm policy than Pioneer Hi-Bred as a Dupont 
Company, and certainly less so than the original Arnold Thomas Seed Company and its 
kin would have been if they still existed.    
Downstream from the farm, we find similar firm consolidation, but also 
increasing geographical diversification in terms of sourcing commodities for processing 
and end-use.  Warren Staley, Chairman and CEO of Cargill, states that “Supplier 
diversity is a key priority for many of our customers…Cargill is also committed to 
supplier diversity because it enhances our ability to provide distinctive value for our 
customers...” (http://www.Cargill.com/supplier/diversity.htm, 2004).  Cargill is one 
among many formerly domestic firms that have increasingly spread their sources of 
supply across many countries. Globalization of downstream industries of all sorts makes 
U.S. farm policy less critical to the income of downstream firms, and, consequently, may 
marginally lower these stakeholders’ costs of reforming farm policy.    
Summary and Conclusions 
The last few farm acts have brought to the farm program dessert tray a variety of 
new stakeholders who are not likely to give up their piece of the pie without a fight.  In 
addition, the broadening of eligibility for programs that, themselves, have broadened 
purposes has, as U.S. House of Representatives Agriculture Committee staff person, Chip 
Conley puts it, created “payment envy” among other producer groups who see the 
payment door opening wider.   On the other hand, diversification of farm households’ 
income and wealth portfolios, input industries, and downstream industries may reduce the   11
investment of traditional stakeholders in maintaining present farm policy practices.  
Commodity, farmer, farm household, landowner, and environmental proponent stakes 
notwithstanding, if Federal budget pressures continue, if commodity prices fall, and/or if 
WTO commitments raise the visibility of agricultural policy costs, the price of policy 
reform will start looking relatively smaller. 
The careful reader will note that I have not included the coincidence of business, 
commodity price, and political cycles as a factor in real policy reform.  Conventional 
wisdom has it that the climate for political compromise (between different stakeholders) 
and the chances for policy reform are greater during the up side of the business cycle.  
The facts that commodity prices were high and the general economy was robust in 1996 
are cited frequently as the basis for the successful passage of the 1996 FAIR Act, which 
represents an attempt to reform farm policy.  As we have seen, however, it is easy to 
backslide when economic conditions worsen.  Any lasting policy reform will have to 
have benefits that outweigh its costs across both good and bad economic times.  
A recap shows: 
Factors raising costs of          Factors raising costs of  
retaining current farm policy           farm policy reform 
 
Federal budget spending stringency        Continued invisibility of     
         agricultural  spending     
 
WTO-induced backlash against agricultural support    
A budget-competitive Conservation Security     Environmental supporters as  
Program           new  stakeholders  in  the  status quo 
Long-run adjustment of land prices to      Short-run consequences of 
reflect true value in agriculture        lower farmland prices 
 
Traditional stakeholders’ reduced reliance      New groups of stakeholders and  
on agriculture, due to diversification       “payment envy”   12
 
 
Only fools predict farm bill outcomes.  Those who want to keep track of the odds 
will need to estimate the monetary, strategic, political, and psychic costs on either side of 
this scorecard, and weigh them according to the political will derived from the per capita 
expression of costs to those who bear them.  Not an easy task, but systematic thinking 
within this framework may give the best chance for picking which horse could win the 
farm policy adjustment race.   
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Figure 1: Federal government payments to 
farmers, 1991-2002  
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